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Chinese Economic Statecraft and U.S. Hegemony in Latin America: An Empirical 
Analysis, 2003–2014 
 
ABSTRACT 
If one interprets China’s sizable rise in Latin America as an unprecedented phenomenon, 
it follows that the concurrent story of declining American influence in the region is an 
event hastily acknowledged at best and ignored at worst. In this article we ask whether 
Chinese economic statecraft in Latin America was related to the declining U.S. 
hegemonic influence in the region and explore how. To do so we analyse (a) foreign 
direct investments (b) bank loans and (c) international trade from 2003 to 2014, when 
China became a major player in the region. We use data from 21 Latin American 
countries and find that an inversely proportional relationship exists between the 
investments made by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), bank loans, manufacturing 
exports, and the U.S. hegemonic influence exerted in the region. In other words, Beijing 
filled the void left by a diminished American presence in the latter’s own “backyard”.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The ‘grand strategy’ debate regarding the implications of China’s rise is divided into two 
camps. On one hand, hegemonic stability (Gilpin, 1983) and power transition (Organski , 
1958)1 theories, together with offensive realism (Mearsheimer, 2001)2, agree that as the 
Chinese economy continues to grow, geopolitical competition will increase between 
Beijing and Washington reaching beyond Asia. On the other hand, balance of power 
theorists, power diffusion adherents, and defensive realist scholars (Schweller & Pu, 
2011; Mastanduno, 2009) believe that a stable bi- or multi-polar world is possible if 
China decides to respect “the rules of the game” whilst “[avoiding] challenge[s to] other 
powers in their hemispheres” (Odgaard, 2013). Most non-realist scholars who avoid 
problematizing geopolitical competition share the latter argument3. 
Latin America is a critical region for analyzing this power transition (Paz, 2012). 
Due to Washington’s overwhelming superiority in the military and economic realms, the 
region has been considered the backbone of American hemispheric hegemony ever since 
World War II (Mearsheimer, 2001). However, Latin America’s political and economic 
alignment with the U.S. –which had reached unprecedented levels in the aftermath of the 
Cold War – would be fundamentally revised in the 21st century, partly due to China. 
While the 9/11 attacks drew U.S. attention to the Middle East and Central Asia 
downgrading the foreign policy priority of Latin America (Hakim, 2006), the region 
experienced a leftist turn amongst its leaders, many of whom became emboldened by the 
Chinese-led commodity boom while vociferously opposing traditional rules of 
hemispheric governance (Castañeda, 2006; Ferchen, 2011; Malamud & Schenoni 2015).  
Our work asks whether Chinese economic expansion into Latin America was 
mediated by political considerations regarding U.S. influence. Specifically, we inquire 
whether U.S. linkages (see Levitsky and Way, 2010) with specific countries affected 
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trade flows, FDI inflows, and bank loans coming from China. Previous research has 
analysed whether the Chinese development model proposes an alternative to the 
‘Washington Consensus’ (Ferchen 2013)4 and to what extent trade relations between 
China and Latin America have led to foreign policy convergence between the two 
(Flores-Macías and Kreps 2013). However, no one has yet explored whether a trade-off 
exists between Chinese-Latin American economic bonds, on the one hand, and linkages 
to the U.S., on the other. Evidence of such relation would be of utmost interest for those 
concerned with the possibility of geo-economic competition between China and the U.S. 
in the Western Hemisphere.  
We find that there is an inversely proportional relationship between the 
investments made by Chinese SOEs, bank loans, and manufacturing exports, and U.S. 
influence in the region. We support our hypotheses by using control groups. These groups 
show that the pattern does not apply to investments made by Chinese private enterprises, 
Western bank loans, or Chinese commodity imports. These results help us to disentangle 
whether China is strategically engaging these countries – an external push – or specific 
countries in Latin America disenfranchised by the U.S. are searching for Beijing – an 
internal pull. Our findings give credence to the idea that it is Beijing who is filling the 
“vacuum” left by diminishing links between the U.S. and countries in its sphere of 
influence. 
Our paper is structured as follows: we first review the tenets and predictions of 
hegemonic stability theory (HST), specifically in regards to trade and finance, and derive 
three specific causal mechanisms – contestation, accommodation and diversification – 
that may underpin the correlation between the growing Chinese presence in Latin 
America and the shrink of American hegemony in the same region. Then, we test our 
hypotheses using a sample of 21 Latin American countries from 2003 to 2014. Before 
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detailing our baseline mode, we explain how we created our index of American 
hegemonic influence by using principal components analysis. Finally, we contextualize 
our results and discuss the policy implications derived from the study’s findings. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEFINITION 
It is indisputable that Chinese-Latin American relations reached an unprecedented 
level at the onset of the 21st century (Bingwen et al., 2011). By 2014, China was already 
the region’s second largest trade partner (Trademap, 2015) and second largest investor, 
only behind the European Union (ECLAC, 2015). Furthermore, several Latin American 
countries established strategic partnerships with Beijing via bilateral cooperation 
agreements. The China-driven commodity boom became a long-term boon (see Ferchen, 
2011) as relations went far beyond trade to include financial and political components. 
Beijing is now involved in the most ambitious projects of infrastructure in the region: (a) 
three nuclear plants and the improvement of trains in Argentina5; (b) a transcontinental 
train between Brazil and Peru6; (c) one of the largest oil refineries in the region in 
Ecuador7; (d) the Toromocho project administered by the Chinalco mining in Peru8; (e) a 
project to create a transoceanic canal in Nicaragua9, and (f) a LAC-China Infrastructure 
Fund in partnership with the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB)10. 
If one takes Robert Keohane’s definition of hegemony as, “control over capital, 
markets, and raw materials” (Keohane, 1984: 139), there can be little doubt that these 
developments undermine U.S. economic hegemony in Latin America, both in the trade 
and financial realms. The main question is whether these dynamics reflect an underlying 
political competition between China and the U.S., as HST would expect, or they are just 
the consequence of independent economic developments. 
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Regarding trade, HST argues that waning hegemonies intensify competition for 
the control of natural resources, which materializes in new trade alliances (Krasner, 1976; 
Gilpin, 1981). Recent research on Chinese trade relations with Latin America has led to 
three stylized conclusions. First, trade has expanded rapidly after 2002. Second, growth 
in demand has turned China into a prominent destination for the region’s exports.  Third, 
such trade involves a limited set of natural resources and is tied to an increase in Chinese 
exports of manufactures (Ferchen, 2011). Although it is not yet clear whether this trade is 
politically driven, the pattern conforms to HST’s expectations. 
In the financial realm, HST has specific expectations related to bank credits and 
FDI. In contexts of hegemonic competition “the motivation for direct investment [and 
loans] (…) is primarily the acquisition of markets and managerial control (…) [creating] 
economic and political relations that are permanent and significant” (Gilpin, 1976: 184). 
In line with HST, Chinese FDI strategy has been described as focusing on securing 
natural resources, gaining preferential access to available output, and extending control 
over extractive industries (García-Herrero & Santabárbara, 2007; Ng & Tuan, 2001; 
Kotschwar, 2014). However, the international political economy of Chinese FDI and 
bank loans remains still to be explored. 
The missing piece of the puzzle is politics, and in particular, how Washington and 
Beijing interact in specific geographies. HST implicates that in hegemonic transitions, 
patterns of trade and finance will be determined by the competition between the hegemon 
and the challenger in a given system. This would be the case if Chinese trade, outward 
FDI flows and bank loans behaved not according to a commercial logic but responding to 
political considerations regarding the influence of the U.S. in specific Latin American 
countries. Consequently, we ask if China has occupied the vacuum left behind by the 
declining American hegemony or, alternatively, the patterns of trade and investment 
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followed a mere economic logic. As we see it, if the Chinese economic rise in Latin 
America has been conditioned by the U.S.’s hegemonic posturing in its “backyard” this 
would provide further support for HST.The following is the first hypothesis that we are 
set to test: 
H1: Chinese penetration into Latin American countries was stronger in areas 
where the U.S. exerted less hegemonic influence, ceteris paribus.   
 Three stories could explain such relation: a) Chinese contestation, b) Chinese 
accommodation and c) Latin American diversification.  
It could be the case that China is actively contesting the U.S. hegemony by 
enacting some form of economic statecraft – i.e. “the use of economic means in the 
service of both economic and foreign policy ends” (Baldwin, 1985; Drezner, 1999). This 
strategy could be based on the understanding that “friends that share at least some of its 
values and principles in international politics would help China to promote its vision of 
global order” (Strüver, 2014: 3), and those friends are to be taken from the American 
claws by intensifying economic bonds. Alleviating the region’s dependence vis-à-vis 
Washington can therefore be a way of forging alliances with Latin American states that 
can prove useful allies in the multilateral realm (see Layne, 2008; Roett & Paz, 2008; 
Paz, 2012). As previous research has suggested (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2013), these 
changes in foreign policy could be attained by the empowerment of pro-Chinese domestic 
constituencies that results from increasing trade and investment (Kirshner, 2008). That 
China is purposively making friends abroad is no longer taboo. Beijing has recognized 
several countries as “Strategic Partners,” paying State visits and signing cooperation 
agreements in areas such as science, investments and finance (Dominguez, 2006). The 
question is if these types of political relations are random or are intended to loosen these 
countries’ ties with the U.S.  
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Alternatively, it could be the case that China is accommodating rather passively to 
the changing strategic environment in Latin America. From this vantage point, Beijing 
could be blending its economic and political goals by expanding purposely at the 
peripheries of U.S.’s areas of influence, trying not to disturb Washington. Recently, some 
authors started to pay attention to the political underpinnings of Chinese investments, 
highlighting the special influence governmental agencies hold over the decision-making 
of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Luo et al., 2010; Sauvant & Chen, 2014; 
Nolan, 2014). In a patent example of accomodation, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) asked Chinese embassies and consulates in host countries to review 
investments and determine if they were in the MOFCOM “blacklist” or if the proposed 
investment would affect the interests of a third country (Sauvant & Chen 2014: 147). It is 
based on this literature that we believe that a country’s relation with the U.S. may have 
deterred specific Chinese investment in Latin America. Unlike the contestation 
mechanism, accommodation does not necessarily involve any change in the foreign 
policy of Latin American countries, but still, it pictures Beijing as a political agent, 
discretely moving where the American hegemony is weaker, trying not to wake up the 
hemispheric giant.  
 Finally, we could envision a third mechanism by virtue of which countries 
marginalized by the U.S. can pursue diversification and turn to China as an alternative 
trading partner. This argument gives agency to Latin American countries and accounts for 
the ideological affinities between China and leftist governments in the recent past. In fact, 
these governments also opposed the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and have 
been at odds with Washington in several respects. Mazzuca (2013) has suggested that a 
“rentier-populist coalition” – amalgamating the government and state bureaucrats with 
the unemployed and informal workers – blossomed in these countries. This coalition had 
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specific incentives to abandon the ties with Western investors and institutions and turn to 
China as a new partner. In a nutshell, his argument is that commodity exports to China 
provided an enormous source of taxable income that these governments could 
appropriate. This rent would then be used to pay the costs of abandoning the rigid rules of 
the ‘Washington Consensus’ and build a political coalition based on public expenditure. 
In principle, all three mechanisms – contestation, accommodation and diversification – 
could explain the relation denoted in H1. However, the third mechanism provides distinct 
observational implications, as it gives agency to Latin American countries and neglects 
any involvement of the Chinese government in the process. Furthermore, it suggests that 
U.S. influence should be negatively correlated with commodity exports to China – a 
sector that is overwhelmingly determined by prices and where the state has a very limited 
role. To test for the importance of the Chinese government in this story, we include a 
second hypothesis: 
H2: The relation stated in H1 is true for entities closely related to the Chinese 
government – SOEs FDI, Chinese bank loans, and manufacturing exports –– but does not 
hold for commodity exports to China.  
Therefore, H2 is set to test whether the filling of the vacuum left by the U.S. (H1) 
– a primarily political dynamic – is driven by actors influential to Beijing’s decision-
making process (see Jakobson & Knox 2010: 24) or Latin American countries benefited 
by the commodity boom and intending diversification. In other words, if H2 is right, then 
the Chinese state has some degree of agency in the process either by pursuing 
accommodation or contestation.  
Although we have discussed these three mechanisms in detail, we are aware of the 
limitations that a cross-national time-series design entails for testing particular causal 
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processes. No doubt the three causal mechanisms we lay out in this section deserve to be 
further explored, and case studies would be especially suitable to unearth their nuances.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research Data 
To test our hypotheses, we constructed a dataset for 21 Latin American countries 
from 2003 to 2014 11. We empirically measured our dependent variable, Chinese 
economic penetration, with three different strategies: (a) Chinese FDI; (b) Chinese bank 
loans; and (c) Chinese manufacturing exports to Latin America. These three dependent 
variables are measured in per capita terms so that we can observe the real impact in each 
country independent of its size.  In order to test our hypotheses and isolate the political 
determinants from the economic ones, we use controls for each dependent variable.  
We divided Chinese FDI into investments made by SOEs and privately-owned 
enterprises (POEs) expecting that the political bias would be clearer among SOEs. 
Assuming that loans from Chinese banks due in fact reflect a geo-economic strategy 
given the strong state intervention in the decision-making process (Yazar, 2015; Collins 
& Gottwald, 2014), we compare them to loans granted by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and credits from the International Development 
Association (IDA). Finally, building on the discussion on revealed comparative 
advantages, we test if Chinese manufacturing exports were conditioned by proximity to 
the U.S. and we compare them to Chinese commodity imports. Table 1 contains the 
description and sources for the three dimensions of our dependent variable.  
[Table 1] 
As discussed above, each of the causal mechanism behind our hypothesis has 
specific empirical implications regarding the dimensions in Table 1. If we found that 
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Latin American countries were (a) equally receptive to Chinese SOE and POE FDI 
independent of the level of American influence in the host-country (b) Chinese loans 
were not sensitive to American influence and that (c) Chinese exports were influenced by 
the American Influence Index as much as the exports to China, we could argue that the 
degree of penetration by Beijing was mainly determined by the will of host countries to 
deepen relations with China. This would be a situation where H1 holds in the trade 
dimension, but H2 is rejected, in line with the diversification argument. 
On the other hand, if we observed that (a) SOEs were more reactive to the 
American Influence index than POEs, (b) Chinese loans were sensitive to U.S. influence 
and (c) Chinese exports to Latin America, but not Latin American exports to China, were 
sensitive to American influence, we would have evidence of the Chinese government 
following a strategy of filling the “void” left by the U.S. Although we would still be 
unable to say whether Beijing is pursuing a strategy of contestation or accommodation, 
we could assert with more certainty that it is Chinese economic statecraft what is driving 
these political patterns of interaction. 
To further reinforce our argument that Chinese economic engagement in Latin 
America is not commercially but politically driven, and to differentiate between a 
strategy of contestation or accommodation, we explore the effects that having diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan (to observe the effect of the One China Policy12), and establishing 
Strategic Partnerships with China have on Beijing’s economic penetration. Our findings 
suggest that these political considerations were far from being mere ‘cheap talk’ and 
significantly influenced Chinese economic statecraft through a proactive contestatory 
engagement. 
Data on Chinese FDI was retrieved from the Chinese Global Investment Tracker 
maintained by the Heritage Foundation (Scissors, 2011). This is the only publicly 
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available Chinese investment database that allows other scholars to replicate the 
information. One of the database’s advantages is that it includes information on both 
failed and successful Chinese investments, which makes the information more reliable.13 
This tool excludes tax havens, such as Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the 
Cayman Islands, and only considers final destinations rather than transit points of 
OFDI14. Perhaps the main advantage, however, that explains our source choice over 
alternative tools is that investments can be easily sorted by firms, which allowed us to 
filter by SOEs and POEs. This was a complex and time-demanding process, but one that 
provides a new contribution to a literature that tests only aggregated values of FDI in the 
region15.  
A second means of Chinese economic penetration in Latin America came via the 
increasing importance of Beijing’s bank loans in the region. Since 2005, China provided 
more than $100 billion in loan commitments to the region. Its banks (particularly the 
China Development Bank and the China Export-Import Bank) became important sources 
of financing for a significant set of countries, namely, Argentina, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela. Chinese investment allowed these countries to skirt their penalization in 
global capital markets and Western international financial institutions, such as the IMF 
and World Bank (Gallagher et al., 2012: 5).  
While the literature is lacking about the political drivers of Chinese bank loans, 
there is empirical evidence to suggest a positive relationship between traditional Western 
lending institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and the receiver’s alignment 
with the U.S. (Dreher et al., 2009; Kilby, 2009). Taken together with our hypothesis, we 
believe that Chinese loans followed a similar political trajectory, acting as counterweights 
to Western institutions in the region. That is, it was easier for Chinese banks to lend 
money to leftist countries outside of the good graces of Western agencies and in need of 
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fresh money to finance infrastructure projects. We retrieved loan data from 2005 to 2014 
on Chinese bank activity in Latin America from a database recently created by the Inter-
American Dialogue16. Our information spans 76 loans to 14 different countries. 
The vast literature on Latin American trade with China acknowledges the fear 
from domestic industrialists about Chinese manufacturing exports to the region’s 
countries, and we indeed look at Chinese manufacturing exports to the region in our study 
(Armony & Strauss, 2012; Jenkins et al., 2008; Mesquita Moreira, 2007). During this 
period Chinese manufactures were subject to numerous antidumping investigations. 
Industrial chambers and political parties expressed their concerns over a damaged 
national industry and Chinese manufacturing imports became an issue for political 
deliberation (Urdinez & Masiero, 2015).  
On the other hand, Latin American countries found China to be an active buyer of 
raw materials and natural resources, which made Beijing not only a major trading partner 
for the region, but in some cases even the main buyer. Media and public opinion began 
addressing this phenomenon, and China became a major topic when speaking about 
economic growth in the region. Due to the opposition of Latin American domestic lobbies 
and the fear of an “invasion” of Chinese products, Chinese exports to Latin America were 
more subject to political deliberation than the flow in the other direction, namely, China’s 
buying of Latin American commodities. To measure the importance of China as a trade 
partner, we used data from the UN Comtrade17 and Trade Map18 to calculate the per 
capita quantity of Chinese manufacturing exports and commodity imports. Now that we 
have defined our dependent variable, we will advance our discussion to incorporate our 
main independent variable in the sext section. 
 
Measuring American Hegemonic Influence 
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U.S.’s influence in Latin America has been studied mostly thorough a 
historiographical approach that has put little emphasis on measurement (Blasier, 1985: 
211-306; Connell-Smith, 1976; Schoultz, 1987). Some recent exceptions include Finkel 
et al. (2007), Levitsky and Way (2010), and Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán (2014), 
although these works focus on regime transitions and only tangentially discuss American 
influence per se. To contribute to this gap in the literature, we measured U.S. hegemonic 
influence through political and economic engagement indicators in the host countries, 
which we then used to create an index of American Hegemonic Influence in Latin 
America. The index covers the years from 2003 to 2014, defined by data availability. 
A major problem facing researchers who build indexes is to determine an 
appropriate aggregation strategy to combine multidimensional variables into a composite 
index. Using five proxies recurrent in the literature, we created a composite index using a 
dynamic principal components analysis (PCA). PCA is a useful technique for 
transforming a large number of variables into principal components that account for 
much of the variance among the set of original variables (Havre & Williams, 2010). 
The variance maximization of the chosen indicators is obtained by performing an 
eigenvalue decomposition of the correlation matrix for the chosen indicators. Because 
PCA is sensitive to scale differences in the variables, we first standardized the data. We 
followed Kaiser’s rule and retained only factors with eigenvalues larger than unity. We 
examined a scree plot of the eigenvalues to determine the number of factors explaining a 
variation larger than one. We also ran a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy to determine the appropriateness of conducting a PCA, which was successful. 
The resulting scores were rescaled to score between 0 and 1, where 1 was the highest 
observed proximity value to the U.S. in the period. 
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We measured economic proximity to the U.S. through (a) American-bound 
exports as a share of total exports (XUS) and (b) incoming American FDI relative to the 
host’s country GDP (INVEST). For XUS, we took trade flow data from Trademap and 
population data from the World Bank. Data on American FDI in Latin America was 
obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis,19 which 
offers information on American OFDI sortable by country and industry from 1982 to 
2014. It has been showed that trade and investments boost political relations (Keshk et al, 
2004). The U.S. has FTA agreements with 11 countries in the region, BITs with 9 
countries and is one of the top three investors and trade partners for most of the region’s 
nations.  
To measure a nation’s political proximity to America, we used (a) the U.S.’s 
economic aid per capita (ECOAID), (b) its military aid per capita (MILAID), and (c) level 
of convergence in the United Nations General Assembly on important votes (UNGA). 
The data for ECOAID and MILAID were gathered from the "U.S. Overseas Loans and 
Grants Report", informally known as the Greenbook, which contains United States 
government foreign assistance data since 1945. The Greenbook classifies foreign 
assistance on either “economic” or “military” grounds and organizes the data by the 
recipient country and geographic region. We believe the U.S. has used economic and 
military aid as a foreign policy tool, of which Plan Colombia is probably the most visible 
example. The specialized literature on the political determinants of aid is vast and well-
developed enough to show that the political alliances between the donor and the receiver 
are sizable factors in the distribution of aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). 
For data on UNGA, we used data from the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of 
International Organizations Affairs. This source distinguishes between overall votes and 
important votes; we consider the latter, which are more politically driven. If the U.S. 
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records a “yes” vote on an issue while another country votes “no,” that country is 
identified as having cast an opposing vote to the U.S, and vice versa. For countries’ 
annual totals, UN Opposite Vote = (number of opposite votes + abstentions + absences) / 
total votes, where total votes = (number of opposite votes + number of identical votes + 
abstentions + absences). Recent empirical evidence on Latin American countries’ 
alignment with the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly shows that voting 
patterns reflect political alignments (Mouron & Urdinez, 2014; Neto & Malamud, 2015). 
Table 2 offers mean values for all five indicators at the beginning of our period of study 
and at the end of it, showing that during this period all five indicators decreased. 
[Table 2] 
The advantages of working with a composite index are numerous. First, it allows 
for a single variable that condenses several variables of interest that are all proxies for a 
broader concept. Second, the PCA technique does not subjectively weigh the 
components, but rather works with the common correlation among them. Finally, the 
index contains a replicability factor that can be used by other researchers in hypotheses 
within and outside the field. Figure 1 plots a chromatic map of the composite index20. 
[Figure 1] 
According to our index, Mexico and Colombia are the two countries most 
influenced by the U.S., while Cuba the least21.  
 
Regression Model 
We were careful to display each model with controls for variables previously tested in the 
literature to limit omitted variable bias (see Table C in the Appendix for a full 
description).22 Our models include a lagged dependent variable and a panel-specific AR1 
autocorrelation structure23.  
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Our main challenge comes in the presentation of n and t. We followed Beck and Katz, 
which argued that many of the data sets used in political science are characterized by both 
a t and n, and thus the generalized least squares (GLS) estimates derived from this set 
cannot be trusted (Beck & Katz, 1995; Wilson & Butler, 2007). The authors’ 
recommendation consists of three essential steps: (a) pool the data from different 
countries into one dataset and apply ordinary least squares (OLS); (b) adjust for 
autocorrelation by either adding a lagged dependent variable to the model or transforming 
the data based on an estimate of autocorrelation of the error terms, assumed to be 
common across panels; and (c) calculate panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). Our 
estimates are based on these suggestions. 
In order to test our hypothesis we compare model (1) to (2), (3) to (4) and (5) to (6). The 
baseline models of our paper are defined as follows: 
𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
𝑐=15
𝑐=1
 
 
Where the controls for (1) are: TAIWAN, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 
COMMODITYBOOM, AGRIBUSINESS, BIT, EDUCATION, EXCHRATE, GAS, GDP, 
GDP PC, MCOMM, INVFREEDOM, LEGALSTR, MINERAL, OIL, OPENFDI and 
PROPERTY.  
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼(𝑃𝑂𝐸𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
𝑐=18
𝑐=1
 
 
Where the controls for (2) are the same as for (1). 
 
Secondly, 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐴 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
𝑐=14
𝑐=1
 
 
Where the controls for (3) are: TAIWAN, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 
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COMMODITYBOOM, AGRIBUSINESS, DEBTSERV, DEBTSTOCK, ENERGYMATRIX, 
FINFREEDOM, GAS, GDP, GDP PC, INFLATION, INTEREST, M2, MINERAL and OIL. 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 𝑖,𝑡 
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑊𝐸𝑆𝑇 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
𝑐=14
𝑐=1
 
Where the controls for (4) are the same as for (3). Finally, 
 
 
𝑋𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑈𝐹 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
𝑐=11
𝑐=1
 
 
Where the controls for (5) are: TAIWAN, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 
COMMODITYBOOM, EXCHRATE, FTA, GDP PC, INDUEMP, INFLATION, 
TRADEOPEN, MANUFTAX, TAXWEIGHT, TERMSTRADE and TRADEFREEDOM. 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
𝑐=11
𝑐=1
 
 
Where the controls for (6) are: TAIWAN, STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP, 
COMMODITYBOOM, AGRIBUSINESS, EXCHRATE, FTA, GAS, GDP PC, INDUEMP, 
MINERAL, OIL, TRADEOPEN, TERMSTRADE and TRADEFREEDOM. 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Main Results 
Our results are presented in Table 3. In line with H1, the American influence 
index was negatively related to increasing Chinese investment, trade, and credit 
penetration during the period of study.  On the other hand, our control groups show they 
were not affected by it, which give robustness to our findings. In line with H2, by 
analysing US INFLUENCE, TAIWAN and STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP we observe that 
entities closely related to the Chinese government targeted countries with strategic 
partnerships and low US INFLUENCE and avoided countries with diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan and high US INFLUENCE. The interpretation of these findings tells us that 
China applied either an accommodation or a contestation strategy.  
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[Table 3] 
In order to visualize the expected values of the dependent variables in each model, 
we employed statistical simulations to convert the raw output of statistical procedures 
into results that are simpler to understand, independent of one’s statistical training (King 
et al., 2000).  
The Effect on State-Owned Enterprises 
The main finding of model (1) confirms our hypothesis for SOEs. Holding all 
variables constant, increasing the influence index by one unit translates into a decrease in 
SOE Chinese FDI of $81 USD per capita. This effect is considerably large. In 
standardized beta coefficients, it represents a decrease of 0.72 standard deviations from 
the dependent variable. 
Figure 2 illustrates the expected effect on investments as the American influence 
index increases at 95% confidence interval. Keeping all other variables constant, when 
American influence is low, yearly investments are expected to reach as much as $60 USD 
per capita a year. The expected investments remain positive as the index increases despite 
the fact that the confidence interval narrows.  
[Figure 2] 
Together with US INFLUENCE, we have highlighted TAIWAN, since we believe 
the latter’s effect to be complimentary to the former as it reflects the One China Policy, 
which is politically driven, and also STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP showing that these 
status is not merely ‘cheap talk’. During the period studied, Chinese SOEs invested on 
average $15 USD less per person in countries that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 
and 53 more in countries with Strategic Partnerships, ceteris paribus. This is not a minor 
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detail considering that this indicator also denotes a political determinant behind the 
investments.  
We controlled for three motives for why companies engage in foreign markets: 
natural resource seeking, market seeking, and efficiency seeking (Dunning, 1999). 
Natural resource seeking FDI is justified by the fact that these resources––e.g. minerals, 
raw materials and agricultural products––tend to be location specific. Resource 
endowments (GAS, OIL, MINERAL, and AGRIBUSINESS) and the existing trade 
relations for these goods (MCOMM) are the main reasons behind these types of FDI. 
Investment-friendly government policy (BIT, CORRU, INVFREEDOM, PROPERTY, 
LEGALSTR and OPENFDI) and market size (GDP) are the main reasons behind market 
seeking FDI.  
Within the statistically significant controls, AGRIBUSINESS is positively related 
to SOE FDI. The coefficient’s size is small, but still statistically significant. Chinese 
firms have faced several obstacles to investment in Latin American agricultural sectors. 
Some of the region’s domestic legislation has limited Chinese investment in land 
acquisition24. Despite these obstacles, however, China has continued to invest in land, 
mainly with infrastructure projects to improve the transportation of commodities. 
COMMODITY BOOM has been introduced in the model to control for the effect 
described by Ferchen (2011), and the findings show that SOEs FDI were higher during 
periods in which commodity prices were actually going low.   
Part of the literature on Chinese investments predicts that the larger the domestic 
market (captured by GDP and GDP per capita) and better the business environment 
(CORRU and LEGAL), the larger the amount of investment (Cheung & Qian, 2009). 
Other authors, however, have found that Chinese investments are positively related to 
political and economic risk (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012). This paper is in 
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line with Cheung & Qian (2009), since LEGALSTR denote that SOEs have been sensitive 
to expropriation and bribery risks, and also have been boosted by BITs. In the absence of 
an international investment oversight vehicle, BITs constitute the most important 
mechanism for the protection and regulation of OFDI, and China has signed more BITs 
than any other country in the world, save for Germany (Wang & French, 2014). When 
analyzing host-country determinants of Chinese OFDI between 2003 and 2008, Amighini 
et al. (2013) test the BIT variable and report a positive effect. We found it to be 
significant only for SOEs. 
GAS is also negatively related to the dependent variable. Bolivia and Trinidad and 
Tobago are the two countries with largest gas expenditures and have not received high 
levels of investment from SOEs. While most of Chinese energy investments have gone to 
oil (of the $20.8 billion USD invested, over 50% has gone to Brazil, followed by 
Venezuela, and Argentina), only $3.4 billion USD has been invested in gas. Again, Brazil 
received 50% of those investments, followed by Argentina and Venezuela.  
Model 2 treats POEs as a control group for SOE investments and gives robustness 
to our findings since they were subject to American influence in Latin America in an 
almost null way (see Figure 2). Even when POEs were negatively affected by the One-
China Policy, investing less in countries that maintain formal relations with Taiwan, 
POEs paid more attention to countries with no Strategic Partnerships with China.   
Our controls also highlight differences between POEs and SOEs. POEs are 
positively associated to GDP-measured market size, and are negatively related to GDP 
per capita of each country. This means that POEs are targeting large, but not necessarily 
the richest markets. They are also positively explained by Chinese commodity imports 
per capita, itself an FDI control related to two-way feedbacks between trade and 
investment between two countries.  
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In contrast to SOE FDI, EDUCATION is positively associated with POE FDI, a 
sign of Chinese FDI seeking competitive markets with a skilled labor force. This is a 
pattern found in investment coming from telecommunications companies and private 
banking. Furthermore, OPENFDI is statistically significant, showing that private 
companies’ behaviour is highly sensitive to the domestic policies of the host countries. 
The Effect on Chinese Bank Loans 
Model 3 gives support to our hypothesis, namely that Chinese bank loans were 
negatively related to American influence within host countries. An increase of one unit in 
the index translates to a decrease of $63 USD per capita in loans. Such a change is high. 
In standardized beta coefficients, this decrease accounts for 0.4 standard deviations from 
the dependent variable. Figure 3 illustrates the American influence index’s anticipated 
effect on loans as the index increases at a 95% confidence interval.  
Keeping all other variables constant, when the U.S.’s influence is low, loans were 
expected to be $15 to $35 USD larger per capita a year. The American influence index’s 
expected effect on loans remains positive as the index increases despite the fact that the 
confidence interval narrows, which we can observe with SOE investment. When one 
increases above 0.5 in the index, investments no longer maintain this positive relationship 
as the lower bound crosses the threshold of zero loans.  
[Figure 3] 
The control set is different from the tools used to test FDI.  As suggested by 
Gallagher et al., Chinese loans are likely an alternative source of capital for countries 
unable to obtain loans from Western agencies (Gallagher, 2012: 5). Thus, we set 
DEBTSERV and DEBTSTOCK as the controls. Furthermore, we controlled for variables 
commonly referenced in the literature such as M2, INTEREST and FINFREEDOM.  
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As in Chinese FDI, the One China Policy has a negative effect on loans, as 
countries diplomatically friendly with Taiwan are expected to lose $21 USD per capita 
more per loan, ceteris paribus. However, Chinese bank seem to have lended indistinctly 
to countries independently of them having or not Strategic Partnership status. 
Furthermore, lending from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB) has comparatively lower inflation rates and greater financial freedom 
(FINFREEDOM) (Easterly, 2005). Chinese loans seem to exhibit higher tolerance to 
these variables. The coefficients indicate that loans are directed to countries with 
significant natural resources, such as energy matrices operating on sufficient quantities of 
oil and gas, as well as countries with agribusiness resources. Furthermore, the commodity 
boom enhanced loans by Chinese banks.  
Per the Inter-American Dialogue database, a large share of Chinese loans was 
directed to infrastructure projects such as ports or railroads to specifically improve the 
movement of grains, or for oil-related projects. Finally, loans are subjected to the foreign 
debt holdings of host countries. When we look at IRDB loans, they are––as expected—
immune to both US influence and the One China policy.  
The Effect on Chinese Exports 
Our fifth model confirms our hypothesis (H2), once again. Manufacturing exports 
per capita are negatively affected by American influence. Keeping all other variables 
constant, one unit increase in the index translates into an export loss of $15 USD per 
capita. Translated into standard deviations this increase represents a change of 0.06. This 
finding is in line with the results of Flores-Macias and Kreps (2013) who argue that the 
effects of bilateral trade on vote convergence in human rights issues at the UNGA was 
larger for Africa vis-à-vis Latin America, probably because “Latin America has 
   
23 
 
historically resided in the U.S.’ sphere of influence, hindering realignment toward China” 
(p.368). 
When compared with the American influence held on FDI and Chinese loans, 
Washington’s effect on trade is considerably smaller. Figure 4 visualizes this effect. 
Between countries with weak and strong American influence there is a difference of 
approximately $10 USD per capita. Here too, Chinese manufactured exports were 
indifferent to the One China policy, but Strategic Partnerships affect them negatively. 
The negative relation between Strategic Partnerships and Chinese manufacturing exports 
could indicate the interest of Beijing in negotiating these agreements with markets that 
were relatively close to their manufactured goods. Alternatively, the Strategic 
Partnerships may have served as an opportunity for Latin American countries to negotiate 
some protection for their own manufacturers.   
[Figure 4] 
In addition to common indicators for market size and economic performance, we also 
include an openness to trade proxy (TRADEOPEN) because we wish to control for 
bilateral memorandums that establish that any Chinese export increase is contingent on 
less-stringent protectionism towards Beijing’s products in domestic markets. We further 
control for the existence of active FTAs between China and the host country, which is 
statistically significant and has a substantive effect on exports.  
We included a control for the importance of industry in the economy 
(INDUEMP), which is negatively associated with the level of Chinese exports. This 
suggests a potential competition between Chinese products and Latin America’s domestic 
ones, ceteris paribus. We also controlled for macroeconomic variables affecting bilateral 
trade, such as exchange rates and terms of trade. The former is negatively associated with 
exports, which is consistent with our expectations since currency devaluations make 
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imports more expensive. Terms of trade are positively associated with increased exports. 
This is consistent with the expected, since favorable trade terms increase the purchase 
capacity of a country. Indeed, we also controlled a country’s tax structure, which can act 
as a deterrent for imports. Two variables controlled for this structure, MANUFTAX and 
TAXWEIGHT. While it is true that TAXWEIGHT resulted in no effect, MANUFTAX is 
positively related to Chinese manufacturing exports, which is intuitive. Countries which 
tax their local industries at a greater rate have a smaller risk of cost negatively affecting 
Chinese manufactured goods.  
As a control group, we used Latin American countries’ commodity exports to 
China. While this variable captures an important portion of bilateral trade relations 
between Latin America and China, it avoids the larger question of Chinese penetration 
into Latin America in favor of the region’s access to the Chinese market. While it 
captures the economic incentives for the trading relationship, we were able to isolate the 
political motivator of Chinese exports. Latin American commodity exports are not 
subject to the U.S.’s influence or to the One China Policy. In sum, this information gives 
credence to the argument that China has been buying commodities from a pure economic 
standpoint.  
Regarding the controls, both AGRIBUSINESS and MINERAL reflect positive 
coefficients, while OIL shows a negative coefficient, giving a signal that Latin American 
soybeans, meat, iron ore, and copper have been the main products of Chinese interest. 
While it is true that the region’s open countries were more receptive to Chinese 
manufacturing, they were not the ones driving the commodity boom to China.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The presented empirical evidence indicates that Beijing’s penetration into Latin 
American countries has been negatively related with American influence when the 
Chinese government was involved in the decision-making process. These results suggest 
that China strengthened its ties with those countries where the United States’ influence 
was weak. In other words, Beijing filled the “void” left by a declining American presence 
in Washington’s own “backyard”. To a considerable extent, these results seem to be in 
line with the expectations of HST, a theory that has gloomy predictions when it comes to 
the U.S.-China transition.  
The mechanisms behind this broad trend deserve to be studied in depth, and we 
provide a first conceptual and theoretical framework to do so. On the Latin American 
side, one could argue that governments pursuing diversification are the true agents behind 
this new pattern of interaction with Beijing, but if that is the case, it is still curious why 
only Chinese state-influenced actors – as opposed to other Chinese private actors – are 
responding to this demand. Furthermore, the observational implications of the 
diversification mechanism indicate that commodity trade with China should be negatively 
related with American influence, which is not the case. 
Two particular stories appear to pass our statistical tests. First, it could be that 
China is contesting the U.S. and affecting the foreign policy of Latin American by 
employing economic statecraft to empower pro-Chinese domestic constituencies – an 
argument that is already out in the literature. Second, it could be that China is simply 
accommodating to the changing strategic environment in Latin America, avoiding to 
engaging those countries where the U.S. has a vested interest. The empirical evidence 
suggests by analysing US hegemonic influence, One China Policy response and the effect 
of Strategic Partnerships a contesting policy, by actively engaging with pro-Chinese 
domestic constituencies.  
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Further research should focus on case studies to disentangle the micro-
foundations that underlie these mechanisms. Much should be elaborated on the relevant 
actors and processes taking place in China, Latin America and the U.S. Due to its large-n 
design, this paper could do little to flesh out particular causal processes. However, it has 
unveiled the existence of a clear trade-off in Latin America between being under the wing 
of the American eagle and attracting the attention of the Chinese dragon, offering the first 
empirical examination of this matter and outlining broad empirical trends. 
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TABLE 1: DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEASURES AND THEIR CONTROLS 
Name Description Sector Source 
FDISOEs 
Outward Chinese FDI made by state-
owned enterprises per capita (US 
dollars). 
Investments 
China’s Global 
Investment Tracker 
(Heritage 
Foundation) 
FDIPOEs 
Outward Chinese FDI made by 
privately owned enterprises per capita 
(US dollars). 
Investments 
China’s Global 
Investment Tracker 
(Heritage 
Foundation) 
LOANSCHINA 
Annual Chinese bank loans per capita 
(US dollars). 
Credit  
China-Latin 
America Finance 
Database (Inter-
American 
Dialogue) 
LOANSWEST 
Annual International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) loans and International 
Development Association (IDA) 
credits per capita (US dollars)  
 
Credit  World Bank 
XMANUF 
Chinese manufacturing exports per 
capita (US dollars). 
Trade 
International Trade 
Centre - Trade Map 
MCOMM 
Chinese commodity imports per 
capita (US dollars). 
Trade 
International Trade 
Centre - Trade Map 
Note: Elaborated by the authors. 
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FIGURE 1: CHROMATIC MAP OF AMERICAN HEGEMONIC INFLUENCE IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
 
Note: Equal intervals map elaborated using GeoDa. Shapefile elaborated 
using ArcGIS. We excluded countries that are not in our sample.  
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TABLE 2: PROXIES FOR AMERICAN INFLUENCE OVER TIME 
 
ECOAID INVEST MILAID UNGA XUS 
2003 5.46 6.4% 0.65 45% 34% 
2014 5.24 0.23% 0.39 26% 23% 
Note: Elaborated by the authors. 
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TABLE 3: REGRESSION MODELS 
 
Model 1: Investments 
 
Model 2:  Loans 
 
Model 3: Trade 
  FDISOEs FDIPOEs   LOANSCHINA LOANSWEST   XMANUF MCOMM 
Lagged DV -0.187 -0.181  0.169 0.000933 
 
1.205*** 0.885*** 
 
(0.157) (0.0923)  (0.168) (0.0993) 
 
(0.0377) (0.136)    
U.S. INFLUENCE -80.84** -4.815*   -63.38*** -37.94   -15.03*** -18.59    
  (25.95) (2.175)   (18.10) (25.92)   (4.335) (12.73)    
TAIWAN -15.47* -2.102*   -20.78*** 1.681   2.964 -0.216    
  (6.384) (0.872)   (6.055) (7.529)   (2.064) (5.339)    
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 52.97*** -5.147*   14.92 -13.75   -8.508*** 19.48    
  (15.45) (2.228)   (8.091) (7.974)   (1.918) (16.57)    
COMMODITYBOOM -0.106* -0.0124**  0.195*** 
0.0420  0.164*** 0.0231    
 (0.0520) (0.00390)  (0.0184) 
(0.0857)  (0.0135) (0.0592)    
AGRIBUSINESS 0.00002* -0.00006  0.000019*** 0.000021* 
 
− 0.000013* 
 (0.000009) 
(-0.12) 
 (0.000005) (0.000009) 
 
− (0.00005) 
BIT 36.88* 5.3  
− − 
 
− − 
 (18.12) 
-2.13 
 
− − 
 
− − 
CORRU -0.468 0.079  
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.391) 
-1.25 
 
− − 
 
− − 
DEBTSERV − − 
 0.477* -0.153 
 
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.227) (0.262) 
 
− − 
DEBTSTOCK − − 
 0.302* -0.420 
 
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.126) (0.246) 
 
− − 
EDUCATION 1.777 0.914***  
− − 
 
− − 
 (2.987) (0.238)  
− − 
 
− − 
ENERGYMATRIX  − − 
 0.0874 -0.0415 
 
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.0625) (0.0724) 
 
− − 
EXCHRATE − − 
 
− − 
 
-0.00156*** -0.000478    
 
− − 
 
− − 
 
(0.000309) (0.00191)    
FINFREEDOM − − 
 0.170 -0.428** 
 
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.204) (0.143) 
 
− − 
FTA − − 
 
− − 
 
7.706*** 1.874    
 
− − 
 
− − 
 
(1.412) (7.807)    
GAS -0.690* -0.307**  -1.812* 
-0.861 
 
− 0.0494    
 (0.317) (0.0991)  (0.753) 
(0.896) 
 
− (0.430)    
GDP  -0.0621** 0.00299  0.00325 -0.00104 
 
− − 
 (0.0200) (0.00226)  (0.00778) (0.0125) 
 
− − 
GDP PC 0.00406 0.000376  -0.00104 0.00388 
 
0.00323*** 0.00256*** 
 
(0.00346) (0.000398)  (0.000726) (0.00256) 
 
(0.000918) (0.000394)    
MCOMM -0.0768 0.0605***  
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.0633) (0.0180)  
− − 
 
− − 
INDUEMP − − 
 
− − 
 
-0.692** -0.250    
 
− − 
 
− − 
 
(0.215) (0.333)    
INFLATION − − 
 1.574* -1.199 
 
-0.0320 − 
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− − 
 (0.718) (0.640) 
 
(0.0695) − 
INVFREEDOM -0.147 -0.0137  
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.217) (0.0266)  
− − 
 
− − 
INTEREST − − 
 -0.878 -0.115 
 
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.525) (0.478) 
 
− − 
LEGALSTR 4.135*** -0.398  
− − 
 
− − 
 (1.102) (0.290)  
− − 
 
− − 
M2 − − 
 0.177 -0.231 
 
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.0992) (0.161) 
 
− − 
MINERAL 0.0545 -0.629*  -0.789* 
-0.568 
 
− 4.092*   
 
(0.848) (0.252)  (0.388) 
(0.830) 
 
− (1.766)    
OIL -2.048 0.109  0.147 -0.103 
 
− -1.186*   
 
(1.105) (0.0809)  (1.091) (0.320) 
 
− (0.565)    
OPENFDI 0.206 11.66***  
− − 
 
− − 
 (22.77) (2.329)  
− − 
 
− − 
PROPERTY -0.654 -0.0963**  
− − 
 
− − 
 (0.339) (0.0334)  
− − 
 
− − 
TRADEOPEN − − 
 
− − 
 
0.151*** -0.106    
 
− − 
 
− − 
 
(0.0417) (0.0671)    
MANUFTAX 1.720 -0.253  
− − 
 
-0.000012* − 
 (1.633) (0.174)  
− − 
 
(0.000005) − 
TERMSTRADE − − 
 
− − 
 
0.00009 0.00047 
 
− − 
 
− − 
 
(0.000051) (0.0004)    
TRADEFREEDOM − − 
 
− − 
 
-0.406*** 0.279    
 
− − 
 
− − 
 
(0.0812) (0.249)    
Constant 59.44* 2.526  -26.83 59.57 
 
2.630 -10.30    
  (23.60) (2.420)   (19.53) (38.00)   (9.930) (14.54)    
N 156 156 
 
138 120 
 
143 143 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.21   0.37 0.75   0.94 0.93 
Note: The table contains coefficients and standard errors. Statistical significance is highlighted in bold text. Significance 
values:* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.25 
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FIGURE 2: EXPECTED INVESTMENT BY SOES & POES 
 
 
FIGURE 3: EXPECTED LOAN ACTIVITY BY CHINESE BANKS 
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FIGURE 4: EXPECTED CHINESE EXPORTS 
 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 For a particular focus on China see Tammen & Kugler (2006) and Lim (2015). For a 
critique of this theory see Chan (2007).  
2 For a particular focus on China see Mearsheimer (2010).  
3 For an English School understanding see Buzan & Cox (2013). For a Liberal 
Institutionalist insight see Ikenberry (2009).  
4 Ferchen (2013) discusses if China represents an alternative to the Washington 
Consensus through a ‘Beijing Consensus’ or ‘China Model’. Although we do not intend 
to compare the effects of Chinese trade on local development models, our results 
suggest that more state-led Chinese FDI and bank loans imply a political trade-off 
between Washington and Beijing. However, this does not mean that the U.S. and China 
are antithetical. The Chinese alternative, as we will further explore in the econometric 
models, implies a mix of market-oriented and political-oriented forces that affect 
differently trade, investments and credit depending on Washington’s influence.  
5 The nuclear plants were agreed upon on during the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in 
Washington DC, for the amount of 15 billion dollars. The improvement of 3,000 
 
   
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
kilometers of Belgrano Cargas railway, which runs through 14 provinces and connects 
with Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay, totals 1.2 billion dollars. The latter was one of the 
most celebrated achievements during Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s mandate. 
6 In November 2014 a first tripartite memorandum among Peru, Brazil and China was 
signed and estimated the cost of the work would be 10 billion dollars and that its 
construction would require six years of intense work.  
7 The construction of the Pacific Refinery in Ecuador, estimated to cost 10.5 billion 
dollars, is funded primarily SOE Sinomach. 
8 The project as a whole employs more than 15,000 Peruvians and pays royalties 
important rents in the national government. In total Chinalco has invested some 7 
billion dollars: two billion dollars between 2008 and 2011 and 4.8 billion more in 2013 
million investment that Peru has consolidated as the third largest copper producer, 
behind Chile and China; Toromocho and in particular the second world's largest copper 
project. 
9 Among all the mentioned projects, this is the most obscure and less economically 
viable. However, Taiwan is worried the project could cost it its diplomatic relations 
with the Latin American country. 
10 Approved in 2012 and in force since July 2015, for the sum of two billion dollars. As 
noted in the agreement, one of the three pillars of the project is intended to attract 
foreign companies, especially Chinese ones, and interest in develop mining, energy and 
agriculture projects. 
11 The countries included in the sample were determined by data availability. 
12 As a policy, this means that countries seeking diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) must break official relations with the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) and vice versa. 
13 By successful, we mean investments that were announced and completed. Failed 
investments were announced but not completed and were common in the years studied, 
so special care has to be taken with them. 
14 This exclusion has a significant impact on the results because more than seventy per 
cent of China’s OFDI reported by MOFCOM is received by tax havens.  
15 While we determined Scissor’s database to be more suitable  MOFCOM and 
Thomson Reuters (which is not publicly accessible), it is also important to mention that 
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this source has as a main disadvantage in that it is built using news reports and not from 
official information directly from Chinese companies. It is true that media reports are 
known to be problematic, however, that issue is carefully controlled for in the Heritage 
China Global Investment Tracker since for a project to be registered as successful in the 
database it has to have strong signs of progress. 
16 Inter-American Dialogue: http://thedialogue.org/map_list 
17 UN Comtrade: http://comtrade.un.org/db/  
18 Trade Map: http:// www.trademap.org/.  
19 Accessed at http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdbal.htm, December 2014. 
20 For a summary of the components of the index see table A in the online 
supplementary material accessible at: [LINK]  
21 See Table B in the online supplementary material accessible at: [LINK] The 
displayed values are the averages for the period of study and include the minimum and 
maximum values observed during the period. 
22 Online supplementary material accessible at: [LINK]   
23 We made sure our models did not suffer from multicollinearity testing it through 
correlation matrices and also through VIF. The replication files offer these tests.  
24 For a good example of such failed investment, one should look at soy production in 
Patagonia, Argentina in 2010. 
25 For a robustness check we used the System Arellano-Bond (AB) dynamic data 
method of moments (GMM) estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998), which allows for 
consistent coefficient estimation based on the lagged dependent variable. The basic idea 
of this figure is to calculate the dynamic equation’s first difference in order to eliminate 
individual-specific heterogeneity, which is the source of autocorrelation within the 
lagged dependent variable.  
